When JD Vance, Vice President of the United States told reporters on September 29, 2025 that Washington is actively weighing Kyiv’s request for long‑range Tomahawk missiles, the tone of the briefing shifted from cautious support to outright possibility. The statement came in Washington, D.C., just days after Volodymyr Zelenskyy formally asked the United States to approve sales of the cruise‑missile system to European allies, who would then pass the weapons on to Ukraine. If approved, the move could give Kyiv the ability to strike deep into Russian‑occupied territory, a capability it has been missing since the conflict escalated in 2022.
Background: US Arms to Ukraine Since 2022
Since Russia’s full‑scale invasion on February 24, 2022, the United States has supplied more than $45 billion in military aid, ranging from Javelin anti‑tank missiles to the long‑range HIMARS rocket system. Those deliveries have been funnelled directly to Kyiv, a practice that has drawn both praise and criticism. Critics argue that a direct pipeline raises the specter of escalation, while supporters say it has been vital in blunting Russian offensives around cities like Bakhmut and Avdiivka.
In early 2024, the Biden administration hinted at “enhanced strike capabilities” for Ukraine, but stopped short of naming specific systems. The idea of sending Tomahawks—a U.S. Navy cruise missile with a range of up to 1,600 km—first surfaced in public discourse during a European summit in May 2024, when NATO chiefs discussed “new ways to sustain Ukrainian resilience.”
What’s on the Table: The Tomahawk Proposal
The current proposal, according to officials briefed on the September 29 press conference, would see the United States selling the missiles to a coalition of European partners—most likely the United Kingdom, Poland, and the Baltic states. Those nations would then re‑export the weapons to Kyiv, creating a diplomatic buffer for Washington while still delivering the firepower Ukraine seeks.
Each Tomahawk costs roughly $1.5 million, meaning a modest batch of 30 missiles would run close to $45 million. The budget request, experts say, is slated to appear in the FY 2026 defense appropriations bill, slated for debate in the House of Representatives by early March 2026.
“We are exploring every avenue to give Ukraine the tools it needs to defend its sovereignty,” Vance said. “The Tomahawk is a proven platform, and the European allies we’re discussing with have the logistical capacity to handle the transfer safely.”
Reactions from Kyiv, Washington, and Brussels
In Kyiv, the response was barely contained excitement. Volodymyr Zelenskyy told a televised address that the missile would “force Russia to rethink its entire operational calculus.” He added that Ukrainian commanders are already drafting targeting plans focused on supply depots in the Luhansk region, where Russian forces have amassed artillery stocks.
European officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the idea had “significant appeal” but noted the need for clear rules of engagement. A senior official from the UK’s Ministry of Defence warned that any deployment would require “robust safeguards” to avoid accidental strikes on civilian infrastructure in occupied territories.
On the other side of the Iron Curtain, Moscow’s response was predictably sharp. A Russian spokesperson from the Ministry of Defence called the plan “a dangerous escalation that threatens to widen the conflict beyond Ukraine’s borders.” He also hinted that Russia might reconsider its own arms‑export restrictions, a veiled threat that analysts are watching closely.
Strategic Implications and Risks
From a military standpoint, Tomahawks could allow Kyiv to strike high‑value targets—command centers, air defense nodes, and logistics hubs—up to 1,600 km away, well beyond the range of current Ukrainian artillery. That reach could disrupt Russian supply lines feeding the frontlines in the Donbas, potentially forcing Moscow to divert resources to protect rear‑area installations.
Politically, the indirect transfer route serves as a diplomatic compromise. By involving European partners, Washington sidesteps the perception of a direct U.S. escalation, while still signaling a deepening commitment to Kyiv’s defense. However, the arrangement also adds layers of bureaucracy; each export would need to clear both U.S. State Department licensing and the exporting nation’s own approval processes.
Risk analysts caution that the missiles could become a propaganda tool for Moscow, portraying the conflict as a “Western‑led missile war” and possibly fueling anti‑U.S. sentiment in other regions. Moreover, the introduction of long‑range cruise missiles raises NATO’s own air‑defense considerations, prompting some allies to review their own missile defense postures.
Looking Ahead: Timeline and Next Steps
The next few months will be decisive. The U.S. Department of Defense is expected to submit a formal request to the Department of State by the end of November 2025, outlining the exact number of missiles, target‑verification protocols, and the list of European partners.
Congress will then debate the funding request, with House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Gregory Meeks (D‑NY) signaling “strong bipartisan support” but also urging “strict oversight.” If the Senate follows suit, the legislation could be signed into law by President Joe Biden before the end of 2025, opening the door for European sales in early 2026.
Meanwhile, Kyiv is reportedly conducting joint exercises with Polish forces to practice coordination of long‑range strike missions, a sign that the Ukrainian military is already preparing for the operational integration of Tomahawks.
Whether the missiles will ever be fired remains uncertain, but the very fact that they are on the table reshapes the strategic narrative surrounding the war. As one senior NATO analyst put it, “You don’t get a second chance to move the goalposts in an ongoing conflict. This is a game‑changer, even if it stays on the shelf for a while.”
Frequently Asked Questions
How might Tomahawk missiles change Ukraine’s battlefield tactics?
Tomahawks can strike targets up to 1,600 km away, allowing Kyiv to hit Russian logistics hubs, command posts, and air‑defense sites far behind the front line. This could force Russia to divert troops to protect rear areas, stretching its supply chain and potentially easing pressure on Ukrainian ground forces.
Why is the United States using European intermediaries instead of a direct transfer?
Routing the missiles through Europe gives Washington a diplomatic buffer, reducing the perception of a direct U.S. escalation. It also leverages the logistics and export‑control frameworks already in place within NATO allies, making the transfer smoother and more politically palatable.
What are the potential risks of providing Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine?
The main concerns are escalation and accidental strikes. Russia may view the missiles as a trigger for a broader conflict, and there’s a risk that a misfire could hit civilian infrastructure, which would fuel anti‑U.S. sentiment and complicate diplomatic efforts.
When could the missiles actually arrive in Ukraine?
If Congress approves the funding and the State Department clears the export licenses by early 2026, the first batch could be delivered through Poland or the UK by mid‑2026, assuming the European partners complete their internal approval processes.
How does this proposal fit into the broader U.S. strategy for the war?
It aligns with a strategy of “escalation control” – providing Ukraine with stronger deterrence while avoiding a direct clash between NATO and Russian forces. The indirect transfer model exemplifies that balance, aiming to strengthen Kyiv without pulling Washington into a direct military confrontation.